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Absent Physical Invasion, Governmental
Interference With Private Property Will Not Likely
Violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause:
Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE -
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania no longer Recognizes Pennsyl-
vania's use of Three Estates within a Single Parcel of Land by
adopting the United States Supreme Court's Vertical Segmenta-
tion Rule.
Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002)
The Brisbin Recreation Board and the Locust Grove Sportsmen
Club desired to have the Goss Run Watershed declared unsuitable
for mining ("UFM").' The two organizations filed a petition with
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") in May of 1989.2 The property rights of the Machipongo
Land and Coal Co., Inc., the Victor E. Erickson Trust and Joseph
Naughton (collectively, "the Property Owners") would be affected
if such designation were adopted.3 The Machipongo Land and
Coal Co., Inc. ("Machipongo"), owned 373 acres in fee simple
within the UFM area.4 The Victor E. Erickson Trust ("Erickson")
and Joseph Naughton ("Naughton") property was jointly owned
and consisted of a coal estate totaling fifty-two acres within the
1. Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799
A.2d 751, 756 (Pa. 2002) ("Machipongo).
2. Id. at 756. On July 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Resources was re-
named to the Department of Environmental Protection. Id. at 756 n.1. States are entitled
to regulate mining activities if they comply with specific federal requirements. Id. at 755.
"To be eligible to assume primary regulatory authority ... each State shall establish a
planning process enabling objective decisions based upon competent and scientifically
sound data and information as to which, if any, land areas of a State are unsuitable for all
or certain types of surface coal mining operations. . .." 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1)(2002).
3. Id. Declaring the property UFM has the effect of "prohibiting the mining of coal in
a large portion of [the Goss Run] Watershed." Id. On January 12, 2000, the Common-
wealth Court granted the Property Owners' Motion to Substitute the Erickson Family
Trust for Victor E. Erickson Trust. Id. at 761.
4. Id. Of 573 acres, 373 acres are within the UFM area and 200 are outside. Id.
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UFM area.5 Machipongo, Erickson, and Naughton all stipulated
that they had used their respective property for purposes other
than coal mining.6 The Environmental Quality Board approved
the regulation proposed by the DEP designating the Goss Run
Watershed as UFM.7
On July 1, 1992, the Property Owners filed a petition for equi-
table and declaratory relief against the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, DEP, the Environmental Quality Board, and Arthur
Davis, Secretary of Environmental Protection (collectively, "the
Commonwealth").' Furthermore, the petition asserted that the
designation as UFM unconstitutionally took their coal.9 The Prop-
erty Owners sought to have the case referred to the Court of
Common Pleas of Clearfield County for the determination. 10 In
response, the Commonwealth filed a demurrer." On April 15,
1993, the court determined that the regulation was not unconsti-
tutional and that the Environmental Hearing Board should decide
if the regulation's application constituted a taking.' 2 Both parties
5. Id. at 757. The Erickson/Naughton property in total is comprised of the 52-acre
coal estate within the UFM area, a coal estate of 250 acres outside of the UFM area, and a
fee simple title to 1,150 acres outside of the UFM area. Id. Joseph Naughton has a 1/5
interest and the Victor E. Erickson trust has the remaining 4/5 interest in the jointly
owned parcel. Id. On December 16, 1994, the beneficiaries of the Victor E. Erickson Trust
created the Erickson Family Trust and transferred their interest in the land to this new
trust. Id.
6. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 757. Specifically, Machipongo stated that the property
within the UFM area was additionally used for the sale of timber and for leases for gas
development. Id. The Erickson and Naughton property owners also used their property for
gas development leases. Id.
7. Id. at 757-58. The DEP conducted a study in conformance with 52 P.S. § 1396.4e
which provided that the proposed mining activities would have a detrimental effect on
water quality and wild trout populations in Goss Run. Id. at 757. The approved regulation
read: "The surface mineable coal reserves within the Goss Run Watershed upstream of the
Brishin Dam, including a small tract of land within the Goss Run Watershed of the West
Tributary to Goss Run, a total of approximately 555 acres, are designated unsuitable for all
types of surface mining activities.'" Id. at 758 (citing 25 PA. CODE § 86.130(h)(14)).
8. Brief on Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellees Machipongo at 5, Machipongo Land and
Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (No. 119
Pittsburgh 2001).
9. Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellants Commonwealth at 7, Machipongo Land
and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (No.
112 Pittsburgh 2001).
10. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 758.
11. Id. In addition to the demurrer, the Commonwealth filed preliminary objections.
Id. A demurrer is defined as "[an allegation of a defendant, which, admitting the matters
of fact alleged by complaint or bill to be true, shows that as they are therein set forth they
are insufficient for the plaintiff to proceed upon or to oblige the defendant to answer[.]"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (7th ed. 1999).
12. Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 624
A.2d 742, 751-54 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1993) ("Machipongo I"). The court also held that the
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appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed,
concluding that the Environmental Hearing Board was not the
proper forum to decide taking and that the Court of Common
Pleas had jurisdiction. 3 On reargument, the Supreme Court va-
cated the decision that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdic-
tion and remanded to the Commonwealth Court to determine
whether the regulation constituted a taking.
14
On remand, the Property Owners contested whether the UFM
designation of their property was accurate by filing a Petition for
Review with the Commonwealth Court. 5 The Commonwealth
then moved for summary judgment, which the court denied be-
cause issues of fact existed. 6 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth
Court entered an order on October 28, 1999, prohibiting the Com-
monwealth from introducing evidence on the issue of whether the
proposed mining activities constitute a public nuisance. 7 On Au-
Property Owners did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. at 751. The
Commonwealth Court granted, in part, and denied, in part to the Commonwealth's pre-
liminary objections. Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellants Commonwealth at 7, Machi-
pongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa.
2002) (No. 112 Pittsburgh 2001).
13. Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 648
A.2d 767, 768-71 (Pa. 1994) ("Machipongo II"). The court also affirmed the Commonwealth
Court's holding that the Property Owners were not required to exhaust their administra-
tive remedies. Id. at 769.
14. Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 676
A.2d 199, 200 (Pa. 1996) ("Machipongo III"). The basis for the Supreme Court's decision
was that the regulation alleged to have taken the Property Owner's coal was adopted under
the Commonwealth's police power rather than the Eminent Domain Code. Id. at 203. The
regulation, thereby, did not fall within any of the exceptions to Section 761(a) of the Judi-
cial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1). Id. at 202-03.
15. Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 719
A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1998) ("Machipongo IV").
16. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 759-60. Summary judgment is defined as "a procedural
device available for prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without trial when
there is no dispute as to either material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed
facts, or if only question of law is involved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (7th ed. 1999).
The specific issue of fact was whether the coal estate had any independent value. Id. at
760. The court employed the Lucas analysis to determine whether there was a taking. Id.
at 759 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). The factors
to be considered are:
[W]hether the public interest requires regulatory interference with the property
right; whether the regulation is reasonably related to that goal; whether the
amount of property taken deprives an owner of all economical viable uses of the
property, measured by what is taken (the numerator) against what was left (the
denominator); [and] whether the property owner's actions or proposed actions would
cause a nuisance.
Id. The Commonwealth Court determination was such that the coal estates were used as
the denominators. Id.
17. Id. at 761. The Commonwealth could introduce evidence to the extent the Property
Owners would be denied a permit to mine coal under the Surface Mining Act or regulations
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gust 21, 2000, after trial, the Commonwealth Court ruled that a
regulatory taking occurred with regard to the Erickson/Naughton
surface reserves and the Machipongo underground reserves.18 On
October 25, 2000, the Commonwealth filed an appeal, and on No-
vember 12, 2000, the Property Owners filed a cross-appeal. 9
The central issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was whether the taking of a coal estate occurred when the Com-
monwealth approved the regulation designating some of the Prop-
erty Owners' land as UFM without providing just compensation to
the land owners.2 0 The court reversed and remanded finding, in
the absence of additional facts, that the regulation did not consti-
tute a taking.2 '
Before addressing the specific inquiry of the case, Justice New-
man, writing a unanimous opinion, determined whether a transfer
from the Victor E. Erickson Trust to the Erickson Family Trust
deprived the Erickson Family Trust of standing to pursue the tak-
ings claim.22 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that standing ex-
ists in a regulatory taking claim even though the ownership of the
property was transferred after the regulation became effective.
The beneficiaries of the Victor E. Erickson Trust voluntarily trans-
ferred the trust property, to a newly formed trust, the Erickson
Family Trust, on the same day that the transferred property be-
came designated UFM.24 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, fol-
promulgated thereunder. Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellants Commonwealth at 9,
Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d
751 (Pa. 2002) (No. 112 Pittsburgh 2001).
18. Machipongo Land and Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 248 M.D. 1992, slip op.
The Erickson/Naughton surface reserves consisted of 27 acres and the Machipongo under-
ground reserves comprised 96 acres. Id. at 38. The 35-acre Machipongo surface reserve
was not stricken from the regulation, therefore the Commonwealth Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. Id. Final judgment was entered on October 19, 2000. Brief on Ap-
peal of Plaintiffs-Appellees Machipongo at 10, Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (No. 119 Pittsburgh 2001).
19. Brief on Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellees Machipongo at 10, Machipongo Land and
Coal Company, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (No. 119
Pittsburgh 2001).
20. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 755.
21. Id. at 775-76.
22. Id. at 761-62. The Commonwealth argued that Erickson lacked standing because
the property transferred from one trust to another with no new beneficiaries on the date
the property was designated UFM. Id. at 761.
23. Id. at 762. The transfer of ownership in Palazzolo occurred as a matter of law and
the transferred property was from a corporation to an individual after the effective date of
the regulation. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614 (2001).
24. Id. at 757. The beneficiaries to the Victor E. Erickson Trust are the same benefici-
aries to the Erickson Family Trust. Id. The Erickson Family Trust is referred to as
("Erickson").
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lowing the U.S. Supreme Court, held that standing to assert a
regulatory takings claim exists where property is transferred from
one trust to another, with no new beneficiaries, and there was no
physical invasion authorized by the regulation. 5
After determining that the Erickson Family Trust had standing,
Justice Newman moved to analyze the problem that arises when
the government regulates privately owned property.26 Specifically,
the court addressed the aforementioned issue of whether a coal
estate, without payment of just compensation, was a taking when
a governmental regulation designated the land as UFM. 7
The court began its analysis by examining the conundrum, thus
far unanswered, of balancing the rights of property owners to use
their land as they deem fit versus the government's power to regu-
late the permissible uses of that property.28 The Property Owners
argued that the regulation, in effect, removed all of the coal on
their property, which resulted in a physical invasion.29 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that a regulatory taking exists when a
regulation authorizes physical invasion."° However, the majority
was not persuaded by the Property Owners' physical invasion ar-
gument and determined that no physical invasion occurred, actu-
ally or effectually.3' The court commented that bankruptcy would
befall the government if it were required to purchase all of the
land whose uses it wanted to regulate.32 The majority stated that
a regulatory taking does not occur simply because the most profit-
able use of the property is prohibited by law.3 The court did, how-
ever, adopt the standard that when a public burden is borne by a
small number of private individuals, the regulation has gone too
far and constitutes a taking.34
25. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 762-63.
26. Id. at 763.
27. Id. at 755, 763.
28. Id. at 763.
29. Id.
30. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 763 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 422 (1982), which held that a taking occurred because building owners
were required to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their buildings.) "A
taking may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government.. ..'" Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 764.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 765.
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Using this standard, Justice Newman discussed the two tests
that have been routinely applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in
"non-appropriated/non-physical" invasion cases.35 The tests are
utilized in different situations. 6 The Lucas" analysis is employed
when a regulation completely deprives the owner from using the
property." The other analysis, the traditional or Penn Central39
analysis, is only applied in situations where the regulation does
not completely render the property owner devoid of any uses in
such property.0 Regardless of what analysis is used, the court
must determine the size of the parcel and against which parcel the
takings analysis will be applied.41 The court noted that if the area
were too narrowly defined, almost any government action would
give rise to a taking.42 Conversely, if the area is broadly defined,
almost no government action will be found to be a taking, regard-
less of degree of physical invasion.43 Therefore, resolving the de-
44nominator problem is paramount in analyzing a takings issue.
Because the parcels in question involved both surface and sub-
surface reservoirs of coal, the court was required to analyze the
issues of horizontal and vertical severance.45 Justice Newman first
examined the vertical severance issue.46 Pennsylvania courts have
routinely permitted vertical severance within a single parcel of
land when analyzing a takings issue.47 The Court looked to three
U.S. Supreme Court cases to guide its analysis.48 In each of the
three cases, the argument for a division of estates within a single
35. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 765.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 765. The Lucas analysis is derived from the U.S. Supreme Court case of Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
38. Id.
39. Id. The second analysis has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as an
"analysis pursuant to the principles set forth in Penn Central." Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 616).
40. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 765.
41. Id. at 765. This is commonly referred to as the denominator problem. Id.
42. Id. at 765-66.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 766.
45. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 766.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 767-68. The U.S. Supreme Court had expressly rejected vertical severance as
employed in Pennsylvania. Id. at 766. The court analyzed Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Penn Central, and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002). Id. at 768.
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parcel of land was presented and subsequently failed.49 Conse-
quently, the Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court and defined
the relevant parcel to include both the surface and mineral
rights. °
Justice Newman addressed the horizontal segmentation issue
next.51 The Property Owners sought to have only the coal estates
within the UFM areas and not all the other land owned by the
respective Property Owners used in the determination.52 The
Commonwealth urged the court to adopt the antipodal approach
and use all of the Property Owner's land located in Clearfield
County.53 Avoiding the use of a rigid rule, as both parties pro-
posed in differing versions, the court adopted a flexible approach
that would provide for factual nuances. 4 The majority identified a
number of factors that should be considered in defining a relevant
parcel. The list included:
[U]nity and contiguity of ownership[;] the dates of acquisition[;]
the extent to which the proposed parcel has been treated as a sin-
gle unit[;] the extent to which the regulated holding benefits the
unregulated holdings; the timing of transfers, if any, in light of
the developing regulatory environment; the owner's investment
backed-expectations; and, the landowner's plans for develop-
ment.56
The court was unable to identify the appropriate horizontal
formulation of the property to be used because the Commonwealth
Court did not discuss all of the aforementioned factors, and there-
fore, they were not part of the record before the court.
49. Id. at 768. The Supreme Court refused vertical severance of a mineral estate in
Keystone; vertical severance of air and surface rights in Penn Central; and temporal divi-
sion in Tahoe Sierra. Id.
50. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 768. The courts decision had the effect of overruling the
preceding Pennsylvania court cases regarding vertical segmentation. Id. Pennsylvania
now is in line with the U.S. Supreme Court's vertical segmentation rule. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Adopting the Property Owners' view would prove restrictive and unfair to the
Commonwealth. Id.
53. Id. Adopting the Commonwealth's view would prove inclusive and unfair to the
Property Owners. Id.
54. Id.
55. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 768.
56. Id. at 768-69. The list is not to be limited to the items mentioned and that all fac-
tors are to be given the same level of importance. Id.
57. Id. at 768. The court remanded to the Commonwealth Court to determine the rele-
vant facts in consideration of the listed factors and to formulate the property to be used in
the Lucas and Penn Central analyses. Id.
625
Duquesne Law Review
The majority then applied the Lucas analysis to the limited
facts presented. 8 Under the Lucas analysis, a regulatory taking
occurs if the property in question is rendered void of "all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of the land." 9 The court applied
the Lucas analysis to the Machipongo parcel."0 The Property
Owners argued that because they own coal estates, and that the
regulation deprived them of mining coal in the UFM area, the
land has no economically beneficial use.6 The Court determined
that selling timber and leasing the property for gas development
was sufficient for the Machipongo parcel to be economically bene-
ficial.62  Therefore, using the Lucas analysis, the majority held
that no regulatory taking had occurred with regard to the Machi-
pongo land.63 Justice Newman was unable to determine whether
the Erickson/Naughton property passed the Lucas analysis be-
cause of inconsistent facts.6
In analyzing the case based on the Penn Central analysis the
court was required to consider several factors, specifically, the
economic impact on the Property Owners; the character of the
governmental action, i.e., physical invasion; and if the regulation
promoted general welfare." After considering the factors, the ma-
jority attempted to determine if the regulation unfairly oppressed
and caused a few people to bear public burdens, which should
have been borne by the public as a whole. 6 However, based on the
Penn Central analysis, there were too few facts present for the
court to make a determination.
Lastly, the majority analyzed the issue of nuisance.68 The court
acknowledged that there could be no taking if the regulation pro-
hibited behavior that may also be prohibited by general principles
58. Id. at 769.
59. Id. at 768. A taking does not occur when private property's use is considered a
public nuisance. Id.
60. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 768.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 769. Previously, Pennsylvania courts recognized three different estates on
the same parcel: surface, coal/mineral, and support. Id. This court overruled recognizing
three distinct estates and now treats each individual parcel as one estate. Id.
63. Id. at 770.
64. Id. The court remanded to the Commonwealth Court with regard to the Erick-
son/Naughton property to gather additional facts, i.e., whether they owned surface rights
inside the UFM area and to determine the extent of the horizontal estate. Id.
65. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 770.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court remanded to the Commonwealth Court to determine whether the
regulation constituted a taking pursuant to the Penn Central analysis. Id.
68. Id. at 771.
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of state property law.69 Pennsylvania courts have applied Section
821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in cases to determine if
a public nuisance is present during a particular use of property.7
As a result, the court noted that the crucial issue is whether the
Property Owners' proposed mining activities "would unreasonably
interfere with a right of the general public."7 Additionally, the
majority noted that it is unlawful and a nuisance to pollute public
waters." According to the court, the Commonwealth will prevail if
the proposed mining would impede the public right to unpolluted
water.73 Ultimately, the court left this question to be decided by
the Commonwealth Court.74
The Property Owners averred that the court had formerly ap-
plied a nuisance per se rule which would cause the Commonwealth
to show that the occurrence of the nuisance in question was "prac-
tically certain, not merely probable."75 Justice Newman identified
69. Id. at 772. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-29.
70. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 772. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Section 821B
provides:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public. (2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference
with a public right is unreasonable include the following: (a) [w]hether the conduct
involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is pro-
scribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the con-
duct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect,
and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the pub-
lic right.
Id.
71. Id. at 773.
72. Id. at 774. Section 401 of the Clean Streams Law provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person ... to place into any of the waters of the Com-
monwealth ... any substance ... resulting in pollution[.] Any such discharge is hereby
declared to be a nuisance." 35 P.S. § 691.401. Pollution is defined as "contamination
of any waters of the Commonwealth such as will create or is likely to create a nui-
sance or to render such waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health,
safety or welfare, or to domestic, municipal, commercial, industrial, agricultural, rec-
reational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish
or other aquatic life, including but not limited to such contamination by alteration of
the physical, chemical or biological properties of such waters, or change in tempera-
ture, taste, color or odor thereof, or the discharge of any liquid, gaseous, radioactive,
solid or other substances into such waters...."
Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 773-74 (quoting 35 P.S. § 691.1).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 775. The Commonwealth Court held that no authority permitted the Com-
monwealth to prohibit the Property Owners from mining, and, therefore refused the Com-
monwealth from admitting into evidence regarding the Property Owners' proposed mining
use and the possibility that the use would result in a nuisance. Id. at 772. This was in
error according to Justice Newman, and as a result, the issue of nuisance was remanded to
the Commonwealth Court for a determination. Id. at 775.
75. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 774.
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that the crux to protecting the public waters is prevention, a pro-
active rather than a retroactive approach."6 In light of the past
decisions, and in adherence to growing environmental awareness
and concern, the court dismissed the nuisance per se require-
ment." The majority, in considering all that was asserted, held
that the Commonwealth Court erred in determining that a taking
occurred."8
The question of whether governmental action constitutes a
regulatory taking of private property has been confused and ren-
dered more difficult to answer through the years.79 Pennsylvania
was unique in that three estates in land were recognized: the min-
eral estate, the surface estate, and the support estate." The earli-
est known case to identify the surface support estate was the 1870
case of Jones v. Wagner."' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
76. Id.
77. Id. at 775. The Commonwealth had a technical study performed that revealed a
"high potential to cause increases in dissolved solid and metal concentrations in Goss Run
that would adversely affect the use of the stream as an auxiliary water supply ... and de-
stroying the habitat for wild trout populations." Id. (quoting Machipongo VI, 719 A.2d at
21).
78. Id. The court also held that the Erickson Family Trust had standing. Id. Addi-
tionally, the court remanded the issue to the Commonwealth Court for a determination on
the horizontal boundaries of the relevant property; to apply the Lucas analysis to the
Erickson/Naughton parcel; and to apply the Penn Central analysis to the land of both Prop-
erty Owners. Id. at 762-63,775. Furthermore, the court specified that if there is a taking,
under either analysis, the Commonwealth Court is to determine whether a nuisance or
other state property law would prohibit the proposed mining of the property. Id. at 775.
79. 1 Pub. Nat. Resources L. § 4:5 (2002). The takings clause in the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken or applied to public use, with-
out authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured." PA.
CONST. art. I, § 10. Similarly, the United States Constitution in pertinent part states that
"[n]o person.., shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. According to United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc., v. City of Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania's "case law reveals that [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] has continually
turned to federal precedent for guidance in its taking jurisprudence, and indeed has
adopted the analysis used by the federal courts." 635 A.2d 612,616 (1993). Therefore,
decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
will be examined together.
80. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 769.
81. Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429, 433 (Pa. 1870). The facts of Wagner were as follows:
[Wagner] was possessed of a piece of land containing 4 acres, and that [Jones] re-
moved the coal underlying the tract in 'so negligent, careless and unskillful a man-
ner, and without leaving proper pillars, ribs and supports,' that the surface caved in,
greatly damaging the land, the dwelling-house and other buildings, the fences and
fruit trees, and prevented [Wagner] from having the full benefit and enjoyment
thereof[.] ... The land of [Wagner] was part of a tract called Bergen-op-Zoon, late of
the estate of John Ormsby, deceased. By proceedings in partition in October 1855, the
coal was severed from the surface: the surface, of which [Wagner's] land [was] a part,
was allotted to the children of Sidney Gregg, and the coal purport underlying 75
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recognized that more than a mere contract right was involved
when it said: "Contract may devote the whole minerals to the en-
joyment of the purchaser, without supports, if the parties choose.
If not, the loss by maintaining pillars or putting in props will nec-
essarily come out of the value of the mineral estate."" The Court
held that the mining right was servient to the surface to the ex-
tent of sufficient supports to sustain it, and that there could be no
custom to the contrary. 3 The Wagner Court concluded that the
business of mining in the western part of the state was of a date
too recent to give such a custom the age necessary for its validity.84
The first case in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania di-
rectly addressed the issue of taking was Commonwealth v. Charity
Hospital of Pittsburgh." Charity involved two regulations that
prevented the property owner from constructing a hospital. 86 The
first act required approval by the mayor, the director of public
charity, and the director of public works, or a majority of them
before constructing a hospital.87 The second act prohibited the
construction of additional hospitals." The owner argued that use
of the property was deprived by the regulations, begetting a regu-
latory taking of the property.8 A regulatory taking had not oc-
curred, according to the Charity Court, which held that the
owner's regulatory taking claim was found wanting because the
acres of the Greggs' allotment was allotted to Christian Ihmsen. By subsequent
transmissions, Ihmsen's coal estate vested in [Jones], October 18th 1856, and 4 acres
of the estate of the Greggs became vested in [Wagner] on the 7th of July 1866.
Id. at 433.
82. Wagner, 66 Pa. at 435.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 435.
85. 47 A. 980 (Pa. 1901). The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a
regulatory taking in 1887 for the first time in the case of Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623
(1887). In Mugler, the Court dismissed the owner's argument and determined that prohibi-
tion upon the use of property for purposes declared by valid legislation to be injurious to
public health, did not effect a taking. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668. Were the owner to lawfully
use his property, the Court reasoned that such use was not impaired by the regulation and
that such regulation was merely a declaration by the state that using private property for
certain forbidden purposes was prejudicial to the public interests. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
"If the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or
traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by
any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer." Mugler, 123
U.S. at 670 (quoting Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877)).
86. Charity, 47 A at 981.
87. Id.
88. Id. The purpose of the act was for the protection of the public health. Id.
89. Id. at 982.
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purpose of the regulations was for the protection of public health.9 °
The Court awarded no damages because "the public right [was]
invaded."9
The next case to advance the concept of regulatory taking was
heard 21 years after Charity. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,9" the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
governmental taking of private property through state enacted
laws.93 Specifically, the Court considered whether Pennsylvania
could forbid underground coal mining operations that would cause
the subsidence of private structures and public amenities on the
surface.94 The Mahon Court equated the property right to subsur-
face coal with the right to mine it.95 The Supreme Court found
that, for a regulatory taking claim to prevail, the proponent of
such claim must show that the legislation exceeded the limits of
the police power.96 In other words, the general rule is that private
property may be regulated; however, if such regulation goes too
far, a regulatory taking will be avowed.97 The Court offered little
insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given regula-
tion would be seen as going "too far" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.98
90. Id. at 984. The court placed limitations on the legislature by stating that the legis-
lature is not entitled to do whatever it desires by merely declaring that the purpose of the
regulation is the protection of the public health. Id.
91. Charity, 47 A. at 984 (citing Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co.,
24 Pa. 159, 160 (1855).
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
93. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. The statute interdicted the mining of coal if such activity
would threaten a human dwelling. Id. Section 1 of the Kohler Act provides in pertinent
part that it shall be unlawful "so to conduct the operation of mining anthracite coal as to
cause the caving-in, collapse, or subsidence of... (d) Any dwelling or other structure used as
a human habitation[." Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492 (1922), rev'd 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
94. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there had been a taking.
Id. The statute abrogated the existing property rights and contracts that existed prior to
the enactment of the statute. Id. at 415.
95. Id. at 415.
96. Id. The Court did not clearly identify when legislation goes "too far." Id.
97. Id. at 415. The Court offered some assistance as to what is "too far" by stating that
"[i]t may be doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a
conflagration, go--and if they go beyond the general rule, whether they do not stand as
much upon tradition as upon principle." Id. at 415-16. While to some extent property may
be regulated under the police power, there comes a point where regulation of property may
constitute a taking of the property. Id.
98. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The dividing line between a regulation and a taking was
shadowy and difficult to draw or delineate. Id.
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Applying the newly stated rule, the Court found that the legisla-
tion went too far.99 Diminution in value was identified as one fac-
tor to consider when determining if legislation has gone too far.10
The Mahon Court cautioned that the means utilized to achieve the
ends in previous cases bypassed the U.S. Constitution in that the
government failed to provide just compensation for the liberties
and rights it had taken."
In the 1959 case of Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-
sion,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of
whether an oral contract to mine coal from a condemned parcel
was sufficient to create an interest in a mining and surface estate
subject to just compensation. 3 The three estates were divided in
August 1953, when the owner of the parcel in fee entered into an
oral agreement with the Schusters, which granted the Schusters
the right to mine and remove coal from an area comprising 65
acres."' When the commission condemned the land, Schusters
were conducting mining operations.'O5
In determining the property rights of the involved parties, the
Court ruled that the mineral rights had been separated from the
other estates.0 6 Therefore, the Schusters had a property interest,
the extent to which was determined by the Court to include a por-
99. Id. The United States Supreme Court overruled the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in its decision. Id. at 416.
100. Id. at 416. For determining the value of the property, the Court used the parcel in
its entirety without expressly stated that it had. Id. Four questions were derived from
Mahon:
(1) What is the nature of the harm caused by the owner's use of the property and the
manner of causing that harm?
(2) What is the nature or character of the "taking" or "regulation"?
(3) What is the magnitude of the "taking" or extent of interference with the property
interest?
(4) What is the extent of the public interest being protected?
Gaebel v. Thornbury Tp., Delaware County, 303 A.2d 57, 63 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1973).
101. Id. The previous trend was to improve public health at the expense of the individ-
ual. Id. Additionally, the Court stated the maxim that "[government hardly could go on if
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." Id. at 413. Resolving the issue on grounds of public
health, the Mahon Court never addressed Pennsylvania's method of separating a particular
parcel of land into three separate estates, therefore the law remained intact.
102. 149 A.2d 447 (1959).
103. Schuster, 149 A.2d at 450. The regulation complained of in Schuster was the Penn-
sylvania Turnpike Northeastern Extension Act which empowered the commission to con-
demn "any lands, interest in lands, property rights, rights of way, franchises, easements
and other property .... " Id.
104. Id. at 449. Moffat, the owner of the land in question, had the duty to ensure that
the support estate was sufficient for the turnpike. Id. at 450.
105. Id. at n.4.
106. Id. at 450-51.
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tion of the surface estate. °7 The Court reasoned that in order to
mine coal upon a particular parcel of land, the holder of the min-
ing estate had the right to use the surface estate as was necessary
to conduct the mining activities.1°' According to the Schuster
Court, the Schusters, by way of the oral agreement, also procured
the surface estate to the extent necessary for their mining opera-
tions. 109
In Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City,1 °
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a city
could place restrictions on the development of landmarks without
effecting a taking which required payment of just compensation.11" '
In Penn Central, a building owner sought to have an office build-
ing constructed over a designated landmark."2 When the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission refused to ap-
prove the landowner's plans, pursuant to New York City's Land-
marks Preservation Law, he argued that law, in effect, had taken
his property without just compensation and deprived him of it
without due process."'
The landowner argued that the airspace above his parcel was a
valuable property interest, urging that any gainful use of their
"air rights" above the parcel had been deprived by the regulation,
and that, irrespective of the value of the remainder of their parcel,
the rights to the airspace had been taken by the regulation." ' The
Penn Central Court rejected the argument that the air rights
above the parcel constituted a separate segment of property for
takings purposes."5 In determining Penn Central, the Court noted
factors to consider in determining whether a regulation was un-
duly oppressive, therefore, constituting a taking."6 The amalgam
107. Id. at 454.
108. Schuster, 149 A.2d at 454.
One who has the exclusive right to mine coal upon a tract of land has the right of
possession even as against the owner of the soil, so far as it is necessary to carry on
his mining operations ... As against an intruder ... we will presume that the posses-
sion of the soil was requisite, in order to enable the plaintiffs to avail themselves of
their mining privileges.
Id. at 453 (quoting Turner v. Reynolds, 23 Pa. 199, 206 (1854)).
109. Id. at 453-54.
110. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
111. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
112. Id. at 116.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 130. The owner was attempting to expand the three-estate theory to include
an "airspace" estate. Id.
115. Id. at 130.
116. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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of factors imposed by the Court included "the regulation's eco-
nomic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interfere[d] with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the government action.""7  The Penn Central
Court was the first to note the importance of defining what parcel
of land was to be used in determining whether the value of the
parcel was impacted by the regulation."' The parcel in its entirety
had been designated as the defining parcel."9 Employing the ele-
ments to the facts in Penn Central, the Court concluded that the
regulation did not constitute a taking and did not deprive the
owner of his due process rights secured in the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
120
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly adopted
the analysis set forth in Penn Central for determining unduly op-
pressive regulations.12' The Court, in National Wood Preservers,
Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources, addressed the issue of whether a regulation, the
Clean Streams Law, designed to remedy water pollution, exceeded
the Legislature's police power and constituted a taking.122  Na-
tional Wood Preserves, Inc., a wood preservative business, leased
the subject property.'23 In its wood preserving operations, the
landowner used pentachlorophenol, a substance lethal to aquatic
organisms, and disposed of waste liquids containing this sub-
stance into wells on the property. 24 The wells, in turn, drained
into the groundwater.2 2 Responding to complaints, the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") investi-
gated an oily substance in a nearby stream.'26 The substance was
117. Palazzolo, 121 S.Ct. at 2457 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
118. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
119. Id. at 130-31.
120. Id. at 152-153. The Court reasoned that the parcel was not economically devalued
sufficiently to warrant just compensation. Id.
121. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't. of Envtl.
Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 45 (1980), appeal dismissed, National Wood Preservers. Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
122. National Wood, 414 A.2d at 38-39. In pertinent part Section 316 of the Clean
Streams Law provides: "Whenever the [Department of Environmental Resources] finds that
pollution or a danger of pollution is resulting from a condition which exists on land in the
Commonwealth the [Department] may order the landowner or occupier to correct the condi-
tion in a manner satisfactory to the [Department].. .." Id. (quoting 35 P.S. § 691.316).
123. Id. at 39.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 39.
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pentachlorophenol and fuel oil.'27 Pursuant to the Clean Streams
Law, the DER ordered the landowner to abate its polluting activi-
ties.
128
The landowner argued, inter alia, that the Clean Streams Law
was an impermissible exercise of police power that violated both
the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. 9 In analyzing
the validity of the statute, the Court began by noting that there is
a strong presumption that Legislature enactments are constitu-
tional and the challenger of the constitutionality of an act of as-
sembly carries a heavy burden of proof.3 ° Ultimately, the Court
relied on the test set forth in Lawton v. Steele.' In the Lawton
test, a statute was not in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion if the interests of the public required the interference, the
means were reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose, and
the statute did not unduly oppress individuals.32 The National
Court refined the taking analysis to include a two-part analysis of
the "unduly oppressive" element of the test. 3 Applying the test to
the facts in National, the Court determined that no violation oc-
curred, under either the Pennsylvania or the United States Con-
stitution. 114
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court came dangerously close to
overruling the holding in Mahon.13' In Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis,"' the U.S. Supreme Court was faced
with facts nearly indistinguishable from those of Mahon.'37 In
Keystone, the Court dealt with an act that again prohibited certain
mining practices that through subsidence could cause extensive
127. National Wood, 414 A.2d at 39.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 42.
130. Id. at 44.
131. Id. at 43 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
132. National Wood, 414 A.2d at 44-45. The Court noted that Pennsylvania adopted the
Lawton test to assess Pennsylvania legislation under the Pennsylvania Constitution in
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77 (1973). Id. at 43-44.
133. Id. at 45.
134. Id. at 45-46. The Court stated that (1) the interests of the public required the inter-
ference, (2) the means were reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose, and (3) the
statute did not unduly oppress individuals. Id.
135. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 507 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Keystone, 480 U.S. 470.'
137. Id. at 473-74. The act challenged in Keystone was enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature and that forbid the removal of coal beneath structures in excess of 50%. Id. at
476-77.
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surface damage.' However, Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, distinguished Mahon on the grounds that the issue in Key-
stone was to the facial validity of the state law, not its individual
application. 139 He further stated that the act promoted public pur-
poses, not private as in Mahon.14° Justice Stevens added that the
new law did not make profitable coal operations impossible as the
law in Mahon had.'
The Court noted that two key elements, used to determine the
presence or absence of a taking, were whether the regulation sub-
stantially advanced legitimate state interests, or denied an owner
of economically viable use of his land.4 ' According to the Keystone
Court, no taking had occurred.' The Court reasoned that the
regulation served important public interests.' Following Penn
Central, the Court defined the parcel to include the entire parcel;
therefore, the devaluation of one aspect of the property did not
deny the owner of other economically viable uses."'
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'46 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a regulation that
completely deprives the owner of all use of a subject parcel ef-
fected a taking requiring just compensation.'47 In Lucas, a land-
owner purchased two beachfront lots intending to erect two dwell-
ings."" Two years after the purchase, the South Carolina Legisla-
ture enacted a statute that prohibited the landowner from erect-
138. Id. at 474. "Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine,
including the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal." Id.
139. Id. at 484.
140. Id.
141. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. Justice Rehnquist's dissent disputed each of the afore-
mentioned distinctions. Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
142. Id. at 485.
143. Id.
144. Id. The regulation did not "merely involve a balancing of the private economic
interests of coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners." Id.
[D]etermination that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a de-
termination that the public, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an
exercise of state power in the public interest," and [the Court] recognized that this
question "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.
Id. at 492 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)).
145. Id. at 497. The Court further noted that the parcel consisted of a "bundle of rights"
and the removal of "one strand of the bundle [was] not a taking because the aggregate [had
been] be viewed in its entirety." Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
Using this reasoning, the Court held that leaving coal in the ground was not a taking be-
cause the mining estate was not a separate segment of property to be used in defining the
parcel. Id. at 498.
146. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
147. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
148. Id. at 1006-07.
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ing the two dwellings.149 The Court advanced the takings analysis
by establishing a categorical rule in stating that "[w]here the
State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all eco-
nomically beneficial use ... it may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with."5' In simpler terms, if a regulation deprived a land-
owner of "all economically beneficial use" of the subject property,
the regulation was determined to have effected a takings claim. 5'
However, the Court continued, in the event the desired use was
prohibited by state property law, no taking will be found.'52 Be-
cause the landowners proposed use would not have been in viola-
tion of any South Carolina property law, the Court determined
that the 1988 statute completely deprived the owner of all use of
his parcel. '53
In United Artists' Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia,'54 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that it had adopted the
analysis used by the federal courts."5 After identifying the gov-
erning case law, the Court stated the law in Pennsylvania for de-
termining whether state or governmental action constituted a tak-
ing."' In United Artists', the Historical Commission enacted an
ordinance that authorized the historic designation of private prop-
erty without the consent of the owner.'57 The Court, in applying
the law to the facts in United Artists', determined that the "citi-
149. Id. at 1007.
150. Id. at 1027. After identifying the case law, the Court set forth a clear and concise
rule for situations involving non-appropriation/non-physical invasions. Id. The Machipongo
Court provided the following:
This rule stands for the proposition that regulations that deprive an owner of "all
economically beneficial or productive use of land" are takings unless the use consti-
tutes a public nuisance or are caused by the nature of the use and the owner could
have expected that the government might prohibit it.
Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 769 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-1029).
151. Id.
152. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
153. Id. at 1032. The case was remanded for the determination of damages. Id.
154. 635 A.2d 612 (1993).
155. United Artists', 635 A.2d. at 616. In support the Court cited Best v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606 (Pa. 1958); Burlington and Quincy Railway Co. v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 561 (1906); and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Id.
156. Id. at 618. According to the Court just compensation was not required where the
interest of the general public, rather than a particular class of persons, required govern-
mental action; the means were necessary to effectuate that purpose; the means were not
unduly oppressive upon the property holder, considering the economic impact of the regula-
tion, and the extent to which the government physically intrudes upon the property.
Id.
157. Id. at 614.
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zens of Pennsylvania empowered the Commonwealth to act in ar-
eas of purely historic concern reflecting a general public interest
in preserving historic landmarks which requires this type of legis-
lation.""8 The landowner argued that the Historical Commission
should purchase the properties it sought to protect. 9 Citing Penn
Central, the Court dismissed the landowner's assertion on the ba-
sis that it would have created a great public burden in the form of
a reduced tax base and the public budget would have been de-
creased due to acquisitions and maintenance costs.16° The Court
concluded that there were no other "practical" means that could be
employed to achieve the preservation of historical landmarks.
6 1
Finally, the Court determined that the regulation could deprive
the landowner of the most profitable use of the subject property;
however, the Court found that the property had not been rendered
void of all profitable uses and that no physical invasion had oc-
curred."' Accordingly, the Court determined that no taking had
occurred and the regulation did not violate either the United
States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution.'
Five years after its decision in United, and four years before its
decision in Machipongo, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again
considered the question of when a regulation limiting private
property use affects a taking in Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Plum-
stead Township.'" Although a regulation deprived the landowner
of the use of the property for quarrying, the Miller Court held
other viable uses clearly existed.165 As a result, the court found
that a taking had not occurred.'66 The Court relied on its decision
in United and concluded that in the absence of all economically
beneficial uses of a parcel, no taking will be found.67
158. Id. at 618. Therefore, the first element of the test is met. Id.
159. Id.
160. United Artists, 635 A.2d at 618 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109 n.6). As a
result, the second element is met. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 618-19. (citing Andress v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Phila-
delphia, 188 A.2d 709, 715 (Pa. 1963); and Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City
of Philadelphia, 141 A.2d 606, 613 (Pa. 1958)).
163. Id. at 620. In the fifteen years since Penn Central, no other jurisdiction has ruled
that a regulation for designating a building as historic was in violation of either the United
States Constitution or the state's constitution. Id. at 619.
164. 717 A.2d 483 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999).
165. Miller, 717 A.2d at 486.
166. Id. at 487.
167. Id. at 486.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's view of when a taking
arises was nearly identical to that of the United States Supreme
Court and other federal courts prior to Machipongo. The only no-
table exception was that of a parcel having three-estates. Since
Jones, there have been drastic alterations in the way the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has examined the Fifth Amendment's tak-
ings clause. In Jones, the majority concluded that a parcel of
property had three separate and distinct estates. 16 With the ex-
ception of the three estates recognized in Jones, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania steadily moved toward the United States
Supreme Court method of analyzing a taking of private property
issue. This asymmetry in defining the estate that existed between
the United States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania courts ended
with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Machi-
pongo.169
In any event, it is difficult not to argue with the result of Ma-
chipongo. Recognizing three distinct segments within a parcel of
land provided for an optimal balance in determining the presence
or absence of a taking when different parties owned or operated
the different estates. Of benefit, the holding in Machipongo
cleared up the vagueness associated with Fifth Amendment tak-
ings issues in Pennsylvania. However, this clarity is to the detri-
ment of the property owner or operator. In the absence of physical
invasion, a taking will only occur where the subject parcel is ren-
dered void of all economically viable uses, where the regulation is
not reasonably related to the promotion of general welfare, and
public health is not promoted by the prohibition.17 ° Thus, on rare
occasions will courts find a taking.
The stance taken by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Ma-
chipongo should also not be shocking considering the United
States Supreme Court expressly rejected Pennsylvania's three
estate recognition. 7' As the Court itself seemed to recognize, this
168. Jones, 66 Pa. at 434. The three estates were surface, mineral, and support. Id.
169. If the parcel of property were defined broadly, no government action would ever be
considered a taking. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 765. In contrast, if the same parcel was
defined with a narrow vertical denominator, almost any government action could be consid-
ered a taking. Id.
170. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 771.
171. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 479-80. The Keystone Court commented that its takings
jurisprudence foreclosed "reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property
rights." Id.
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is the strongest footing on which the decision stands.7 ' In fact, the
Court never addressed the consequences of using the three-estate
method and repeatedly cited to United State Supreme Court cases
for its determination. The holding in Machipongo provides little
guidance for future litigation. The Court has opted not to extend
the "property as a whole" rule to all property. It will likely be lim-
ited to those situations where the parcel is owned in fee simple.
Therefore, Machipongo will be easily distinguishable when a fu-
ture case presents facts where different parties own or operate the
different estates. Until then, the affect of Machipongo will be that
of having a broadly defined parcel and almost no government ac-
tion will be considered a taking.
Matthew J. Bauer
172. Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 766. The Court indicated in the first paragraph of its
parcel definition discussion that: "Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique in re-
garding the support estate as a separate interest in land that can be conveyed apart form
either the mineral estate or the surface estate." Id. (citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500).
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